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Conoley: The Effect of Public Opprobrium On Investigative Due Process

THE EFFECT OF PUBLIC OPPROBRIUM
ON INVESTIGATIVE DUE PROCESS
Nothing in the law, perhaps, better illustrates the
enormously increased reach of government in the last
fifty years than does the broadening of the power of
administrative investigations.'
This expansion of administrative power is paralleled by another
phenomena, not necessarily related, of the critical law in many
areas of government having become "due process law." For
instance, the prevailing concerns of criminal procedure, mental
health and loyalty-security hearings, and traffic, juvenile, and
family courts are due process oriented.2 Proceedings of federal
and state regulatory agencies, as well as those incidental to the
average citizen such as Workmen's Compensation, welfare, insurance, public housing, school discipline, and labor relations
also demonstrate the extent of the subject's importance.
"Due Process" simply means "the reign of law" or the "law
of the land", as opposed to rules based on expediency or the
discretion of a particular individual. It is the recognition of
some type of restraint implicit in the fourteenth amendment's
"nor shall any State deprive any person of life, liberty, or
property, without due process of law .

. . ."

That is, due

process is a recognition that "[all the officers of the Government . . .are creations of the law and are bound to obey it

and to observe the limitations which it imposes upon the
exercise of the authority which it gives." 4 It is a concept aimed at
the "arbitrary assertions of executive power"," through the use
...
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Since 1940 there has
occurred a reversal in the constitutional principles which govern the administrative powers of investigation. The new principle is that administrative power
must be made fully effective whenever possible. 1 K. DAVIS, ADm NiSTRATI E
LAW TREATISE § 3.01 at 159 (1958) (hereinafter cited as DAvis). The operation of this principle in the broad delegation of investigative authority has
resulted, in the case of Congressional grants to investigative bodies, for example, in a gradual relaxation of the showing necessary to obtain a valid court
subpoena, so that only a cursory examination by the courts of the underlying

grounds is the rule. Note, Resisting Enforcement of Administrative Subpoenas
Duces Tecum: Another Look At CAB v. Hermann, 69 YALE L.J. 131 (1959).
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of such devices as the opportunity for judicial review. More
broadly, due process has been interpreted to include limitations
on the exercise of legislative power against such power's encroachment on certain substantive rights as well.6
The clearest tension is likely to occur where the concept of
due process of law confronts the area of governmental administrative activity. Due process of law, it has been said, "stands as
the antipole of what the French jurists call droit administratif,
which rests upon the assumption that in France the government
and each of its servants possesses a body of special rights and
privileges as against private citizens to be fixed on principles
different from those defining the legal rights and duties of
one citizen toward another." Although in England and this
country, there has been an absence in governmental institutions
of anything like the preemptory authority of droit admnistratif;8 its nearest kin may well be found in the activity of

many administrative bodies. Some evidence of the tension in
this area may be reflected by the fruitlessness of pursuing any
degree of homogeneity in the development of due process of law
in administrative fields. Only recently, for example, due process
of law was characterized as
an elusive concept [whose] exact boundaries are undefinable, and [whose] content varies according to specific
factual contexts ..

.

.Whether the Constitution re-

quires that a particular right obtain in a specific proceeding depends upon a complexity of factors. The
nature of the alleged right involved, the nature of the
proceeding, and the possible burden on that proceeding,
are all considerations which must be taken into account.9

It is in this context that the implications of the 1969 case of
6. Id.
7. TAYLOR at v.
8. Id. at vi.
9. Hannah v. Larche, 363 U.S. 420, 442 (1960). It has been suggested that
the due process clause of the 5th and 14th amendments be reexamined for the
possibility of giving its words a broader meaning, by discarding certain
encrusted doctrines presently used to include the protection of certain rights
while excluding certain "privileges," although both are contained within an
individual's bundle of "legal interests" and are not differentiated by the clauses'
wording. Life, liberty or property should be read to include all of a person's
more important legal interests, particularly his reputational and emotional
interests which are already recognized by tort law. Another doctrine said to
deserve discard is the "too pervasive criminal trial analogy" used as a guide in
almost all instances as the optimum extent of due process. Newman, 49 CALIF.
L. Ray. 215 (1961).
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Jenkins v. MKeithen"° will be studied, and particularly its
recognition of the harmful results of unfavorable publicitypublic disfavor and opprobrium-on persons connected with
administrative investigations.
I. JENKINs v. MCKEITHEN

Jenkins is the Supreme Court's most recent decision on the
question of procedural due process and public opprobrium during
the conduct of an administrative investigation. In Jenkins, an
action was brought by a union member seeking declaratory and
injunctive relief and a ruling on the constitutionality of a
Louisiana statute creating a state Labor-Management Commission of Inquiry. The stated purpose of the commission was to
publicly investigate potential criminal law violations and to
recommend follow-up action to appropriate enforcement agencies.
The complainant was not called to testify before the commission.
He complained, however, of violations of the due process and
equal protection clauses of the fourteenth amendment, because
the body in effect was an "executive trial agency" with the
function of publicly condemning certain persons, including
generally the plaintiff and other members of his union local. A
three-judge district court panel dismissed the complaint 1 and
the plaintiff appealed directly to the Supreme Court. The
Supreme Court reversed and remanded on grounds that a cause
of action had been adequately stated.
Jenkins follows a definitive case on administrative due process, Hannah v. Larche.12 In Hannah, the plaintiffs were Louisiana voter registrars and certain private citizens. They brought
suit to enjoin the U. S. Civil Rights Commission from holding
hearings on Negro voting deprivations on grounds that the
hearing procedures and the act itself were unconstitutional under
the due process requirements of the fifth amendment. The objectionable procedures were the non-disclosure of the identity of
persons submitting complaints to the commission, and the failure
to permit persons summoned before the inquiry to cross examine
witnesses. A third matter raised was the risk of public opprobrium against those called to testify. The Supreme Court
reversed the lower court and held that such procedures were
not unconstitutional under the circumstances. The basis of its
10. 395 U.S. 411 (1969) rehearing denied, 90 S. Ct. 35 (Oct. 1969).
11. 286 F. Supp. 537 (E.D. La. 1968).
12. 363 U.S. 420 (1960).
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holding was that the function of the Civil Rights Commission
was purely investigative and fact finding, and that it did not
adjudicate any person's legal rights by determining either civil
or criminal liability. The commission, the Court found, sought
out information for later use by some other executive or legislative body.
Virtually identical investigative bodies were before the Court
in both cases. In each proceeding the plaintiffs complained of
the effects of injurious publicity resulting from the conduct of
the proceedings. An important difference between the administrative commissions, insofar as the majority in Jenkins was
concerned, however, was the purposes of the investigative bodies.
The aim in Jenkins was to probe possible violations of state
criminal laws committed by union members or anyone else
affiliated with the fledgling labor movement in Louisiana
while the purpose in Hannah was information-gathering only.13
Appointed by the governor, the nine-man panel in Jenkins was
restricted to recommending to either the governor or some law
enforcement agency appropriate action if it discovered probable
cause. The investigative panel could meet in public or closed
sessions, but it retained the prerogative to publish anything
occurring in executive session. Like the civil rights commission
in Hannah, witnesses were denied an unqualified right to cross
examine or confront hostile witnesses, or offer evidence on their
own behalf.' 4
Two questions confronted the Jenkins court: the petitioner's
standing to complain, and on the merits, whether the complainant
under the circumstances of the particular investigative proceedings was entitled to more adequate protections under the due
process clause of the constitution. Underlying these was the
13. The purpose of the Jenkins Commission was, according to the majority,
"concerned only with exposing violations of criminal laws by specific indi-

viduals." It was to be "used to find named individuals guilty ... and to
brand them as criminals in public." 395 U.S. at 427. The Hannah Civil Rights
Commission, on the other hand, had a function which was "'purely investigative ... to find facts which may subsequently be used as the basis for
legislative or executive action.'" Id. at 426.

14. 395 U.S. at 418. The Commission's procedures in Jenkins permitted a
witness to summon a reasonable number of his own witnesses if the proceedings were in executive session, but during public sessions, he could present
only his own testimony and a few written statements from others. The Commission absolutely controlled the privilege of presenting oral testimony from
other witnesses summoned by a party. The opportunity to confront and cross

examine hostile witnesses was limited to those persons who were actually

witnesses summoned by the Commission, and the questioning permitted had to

be approved by the Commission beforehand.
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important issue of unfavorable publicity stirred by the investigation, and how the existence of such "government-sanctioned
opprobrium"1 5 modified the minimum requirements of procedural due process set out in Hannah.
Although a majority of the justices found that the plaintiff,
a union member, had not been called as a witness, nor was he
scheduled to be called before the commission, the Court concluded that he had sustained injury enough to afford him
standing to complain. This it found from the investigative
panel's "concerted attempt publicly to brand him a criminal
without trial," threatening the plaintiff's interest in his "own
reputation" and his "economic well-being. '"16 The Court emphasized that any public opprobrium resulting from commission
exposures was not collateral or conjectural as it had been in
Hannah. On the merits, the three-justice majority1 7 was willing
to find that the probe for probable cause, when taken in conjunction with the public disfavor, amounted to an adjudication
of criminal culpability, thus raising a substantial issue of
whether or not the petitioner should be allowed additional due
process rights. The Court therefore remanded the case to the
district court for a hearing on the merits.
15. Id. at 442. The problem of combatting adverse publicity arising from an
administrative investigation was by no means novel with the plaintiff's argument in this case. An interesting study of adverse publicity has pointed out
that such publicity or the threat of its use is an accepted administrative device
widely used by some federal regulatory agencies, and need be considered as a
part of the punishment meted out. Threats of its use are used to settle complaints without formal hearings. The SEC, FTC, and FCC are given as
examples. Rourke, Law Enforcement Through Publicity, 24 U. CH. L. REv.
225 (1957) (hereinafter cited as RouRKE).
"Opprobrium" is defined as "something that gives occasion for disgrace or
reprobation; public or known disgrace or ill fame that ordinarily follows from
or is attached to conduct considered grossly wrong or vicious." Webster's
Third New International Dictionary, Unabridged (1965).
16. 395 U.S. at 423.
17. Id. at 428. The majority consisted of Justices Marshall. Warren and
Brennan. The minority, Justices Harlan, Stewart, and White, found that the
plaintiff's nexus with the particular Commission processes complained of was
too tenuous to confer standing. It found the connection insufficient because the
plaintiff had not been called as a witness to testify, or indicted as a result of
any probable cause directly the result of work by the Commission, citing Flast
v. Cohen, 392 U.S. 83 (1968). On the merits, the minority challenged the
majority's failure to distinguish between two types of interrogative proceedings. The Commission here, it said, was merely a preliminary fact finder and
not a final arbiter. Denial of the full panoply of due process protections where
a body is basicly "investigative" is not improper, it felt, since the proceeding
is not then "adjudicative" of a named person's rights. Id. at 433. Justices
Douglas and Black concurred in separate opinions. Their concurrence was
based on their original disagreement with the Hannah result from which they
dissented, in that they believed such commissions to be a "tribunal to charge,
try, convict and punish people without courts ....
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Jenkins shows a willingness to venture beyond the holding in
Hannah. But faced with a commission tailored to appear virtually the same as Hannah's, the majority was hard pressed to
accommodate the element of public opprobrium with its Hannah
due process rationale. The difficulty surfaces when the Jenkins
majority attempts to characterize the Louisiana commission
using its Hannah molds of "adjudicative" or "investigative."u 8
In Hannah, the Court justified denial of more procedural protection by concluding that the interrogation was merely "investigative,"' 9 instead of "adjudicative." Yet in Jenkins, a similar
body is found to be exercising functions "very much akin to an
official adjudication ....2,20
II.

CHARAGTRIZATION

oF AN INQuIRy: ACCuSATm,

ADJUDICATVE, OR INvEsTiGATnm ?

The divergence in opinion by the justices in Jenkins appears

to be less a polarization of views on the purposes of the commission before the Court than a grappling with how public opprobrium affects the characterization of a commission. 21 What
appears to have happened in Jenkins is a side-stepping of the
18. Id. at 427-28. Justice Warren in Hannah distinguished several previous
cases involving investigative commissions by concluding that the others had
been "adjudicative" whereas the Civil Rights Commission's purpose was
merely to investigate and report, leaving affirmative action to other governmental agencies. The Hannah distinction between types of agencies is discussed in JAFrE at 837; Newman, 49 CALIF. L. REV. 215 (1961); and Note,
The Distinction Between Informing and ProsecutorialInvestigations: A Functional Justification for "Star Chamber" Proceedings, 72 YALE L.J. 1227
(1963) (hereinafter cited as 72 YALE L.J. 1227). This last source observes
that the Hannah result forecloses more due process unless the proceeding
eventuates in an "affirmative determination," a "quasi-verdict of guilt." Id. at
1233. The Hannah failed to go far enough, in that author's opinion, in differentiating between types of commissions.
19. 395 U.S. at 426. "Investigative" by Hannah standards, according to one
critic, means that additional due process depends not on an affirmative finding
of an informing purpose in a proceeding, but whether the proceeding leads to
an official determination or punishment. So that even if an informative purpose is not clearly present, a mere non-adjudicative purpose is sufficient to
block additional protections. Note, 72 YALE L. J. 1227, 1233-34 (1963).
20. 395 U.S. at 427.
21. The minority opinion recognizes a need for additional due process protections if government-sanctioned opprobrium is present. Id. at 442. Its test for
the unleashing of such rights is carefully keyed to the purpose of an investigative proceeding. If exposure of named persons is the sole or predominate
purpose, then more rights are appropriate. Its method for discovering such a
purpose appears to be essentially doctrinaire, inasmuch as the dissenting justices would rely heavily on a commission's announced purpose indicated by its
authori7ing legislation, rather than on the actual presence of unfavorable publicity. But apparently, they would not be deaf to a request for more rights in
the face of opprobrium occurring when an agency begins a series of exposures
which are manifestly outside of its statutory authorization. Under exactly what
circumstances they would permit such is not clear from the opinion.
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term "adjudicative" and perhaps indirectly, of the "stated purpose test." A looser standard, "accusative", is evidently substituted by the majority to help explain its recognition of the
effects of public disfavor.22 Thus, according to the majority,
a certain interrogation otherwise "investigative" may become
"accusative" through the presence of certain degrees of unfavorable publicity. The problem which the majority is trying to
overcome is what Professor Jaffe refers to when he says that
"the line between informal investigatory proceedings, and the
formal adjudicatory or adversary hearings, is not crystal clear." 23
For example, an illustration of scholarship which does not
necessarily clarify this area is shown by Davis' use of the terms
"adjudicative facts" and "legislative facts." "Adjudicative
facts" are defined as those relating to parties, their activities,
businesses and properties. They try to answer questions such as
who did what, when, and where, i.e. "adjudicative facts are
roughly the kind that go to the jury in a jury case." 24 "Legislative" or investigative facts, on the other hand, are described as
those not usually concerning immediate parties, but which
merely help a tribunal decide a question of law, policy or discretion.25 Practically applying such definitions to a proceeding of
several thousand pages of testimony is one of the difficulties;
another is that within the same investigation each kind of fact
finding may be present. Is the final characterization of the
22. Whether this is occurring in the majority opinion is not altogether certain. A reading of the majority and dissenting language does reveal a heavy
reliance on the descriptive word "accusative" by Justice Marshall for the
majority, while Justice Harlan's minority opinion relies almost exclusively on
showing the absence of an "adjudicative" purpose. It is probably true that the
two terms have often been used indiscriminately to mean the same thing and
any adjudicative proceeding is also innately an accusative one. Some distinction may be implied from Jenkim, however, other than from word preferences. The majority refers some 16 times in the course of its short opinion to
the "public findings" aspect of the Commission's determinations. 395 U.S. at
415-29. It provides excerpts of those portions of the plaintiff's allegations
which complain of the Commission's obligation to expose. The majority
stresses that the subject matter concerns crime. The targets are named persons. The findings relate to someone's guilt. Important to note is the Court's
willingness to recognize that while there is an absence of an adjudicative
purpose, there is also an absence of a legislative purpose as well. Id. at 416.
The opinion admits that the Jenkins Commission "does not adjudicate in the
sense that a court does, nor does the Commission conduct, strictly speaking,
a criminal proceeding." But, it finds, the Commission "exercises a function
very much akin to an official adjudication of criminal culpability." Id. at 427.
The Court concludes that "[e]verything in the Act points to the fact that it is
concerned only with exposing violations of criminal laws by specific individuals. In short, the Commission very clearly exercises an accusatory function... ." Id.
23. JAFn at 759. See aiso Note, 72 YAm LJ. 1227, 1230 (1963).
24. DAvis at 413.
25. Id.
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investigation by a court or reviewing body to be arrived at by
viewing one type of fact as predominate?
Justice Frankfurter's concurring opinion in Hannah provides
a guide on how to determine a commission's function.28 A panel
exercising an "accusatory function", he says,
is one with a duty "to find ...named individuals...
responsible ...

and to advertize such finding or to serve

as part of the process of criminal prosecution .... .17
The basic inquiry is whether its objectives, purpose of
creation, and true functioning are "charged with official judgment on individuals" or merely "to develop
facts upon which legislation can be based,"28 or "gather
information

..

.

as a solid foundation for legislative

action." 29
Frankfurter would afford a person fuller due process protections if the results of a hearing are likely to be "[j]udgments by

the Commission condemning or stigmatizing individuals .... ,,0

The weakness of Frankfurter's test, however, is that it is
often difficult to determine administrative purpose. For instance, the administrator may want to develop "information"
for purposes of formulating policy and concurrently be "laying
the ground work for enforcement proceedings, either administrative or judicial."3 ' This suggests an underlying weakness of
a "purpose" approach to characterizing a commission. Several
purposes may be subsumed within the announced one, and there
is really no assurance that an investigation's impact will be
anything like its announced purpose. A proceeding may be
"investigative" at its outset and for one reason or other become
"accusatory" during its pendency.3 2
26. 363 U.S. at 486.

27.
28.
29.
30.

Id. at 488.
Id.
Id. at 489.
Id.

31. JAFFE at 722.

32. "Accusatory" has the potential for several nuances of meaning beyond
the fact of a bald exposure purpose. The need to distinguish between types of
non-adjudicative, investigative proceedings has been suggested some time ago.
See Note, 72 YALE L. J. 1227, 1230, 1236 (1963). The absence of an adjudicative purpose would not necessarily mean an informative purpose or one to
generate consent for rule-making or legislative proposals. Any time an investigation draws a bead on a named individual or is involved in the criminal
process in any manner, although for all appearances it is only investigative, it
may actually be pre-prosecutorial. In any event, the Jenkins Court appears
ready to make this distinction, particularly where public opprobrium aggravates matters and exposure is a practice of the particular proceeding.
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The problem facing the Jenkins Court is the retention of
judicially manageable standards while at the same time insuring
due process safeguards against unfavorable publicity. What
then has the Court done by adopting an "accusative test?" 3 One
result of its dicta seems to be a more flexible standard of
characterizing an investigative body. The Court thus attempts
to overcome a basic criticism of Hannah, that the Court there
rigidly ignored the reprecussions of public disclosures by adopting the "purpose" test.a 4 Another result of the Jenkins holding

may be an implied invitation to lower courts to go beyond the

"purposel' test to adequately account for undesirable publicity.3 5

The objective of all procedural due process has been described
by Newman as "the reliability of the determination-making
process," or, "reliable truth determining." 0 The values in such
a due process model as the above have been catalogued as (1)
insuring the reliability of the guilt-determining process, and
(2) insuring respect for the dignity of the individual. The
orientation of many due process models toward only the guiltdetermining value is the result of over-emphasizing the criminal7
due process methodology as the basic pattern for all others.3
The adoption of the accusative characterization by the Jenkins
majority may well represent a recognition that the guilt-determining (e.g., adjudicative) value is not paramount, and that
avoiding the destruction of an individual's dignity may be
equally worth preserving.
The remainder of this paper will deal with how to anticipate
public opprobrium and briefly with the due process alternatives
33. 395 U.S. at 427-30.
34. JAFFE at 758; NEWMAw, 49 CALIF. L. Rav. 215, 218, 221 (1961); Note,
72 YALE L. J. 1227, 1232 (1963).

35. The criteria for determining a commission's purpose are not immutable
nor necessarily very clear. Witness the disagreement among the justices in
Jenkins over that commission's purpose. Purpose may be indicated, according
to one commentator, by an announcement at the investigation's inauguration,
public statements by its members, or the selection of a certain branch or personnel to conduct the investigation. It has also been suggested that courts
permit direct testimonial inquiry into an ambiguously-motivated agency's purpose. Note, 72 YALE L. J. 1227, 1239-49, 1242 (1963). Inherent in this kind of
purpose test is the problem of its application to commissions whose grant of
authority is so broad that they amount to "fishing expeditions." The federal
CAB, among others, has a broad authorization which can lead investigations
almost anywhere, as long as the information is deemed relevant. DAvis at 165,
170 and 230 (1958).
36. 49 CALIF. L. REV. 215, 219 (1961).
37. Id. at 218. Facts that defame, degrade, or incriminate a subpoenaed witness merit special treatment even though there are no subsequent adjudicative
proceedings. See Newman, Federal Agency Investigations: Procedural Rights
of the Subpoenaed Witness, 60 Micn. L. Rzv. 169, 179 (1961-62).
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available when unfavorable publicity may create a need for
more protections.
III.

PUBLICI=Y AND 0PPROBRfIUM

IN INVESTIGATIVE PROEEDINGS

The overriding reason for denying the due process protections
which guard against unfavorable publicity in any administrative

proceeding is a concern for efficiency.38 It is feared that per-

mitting rights similar to those afforded in an adversary situation tends to slow investigative processes, distract proceedings,
and increase public expense. Thus, denial is justified by the
expediency of striking a balance--"the balance of individual
hurt and the justifying public good."139 In the same manner,
publicity of investigations is held to be useful and to outweigh
its harms since it may bring forth new witnesses and inform
the public. 40 But such "window dressing" would appear more

relevant perhaps to broad-based hearings of general public
interest where a consensus is desired, like those concerning
loyalty-security, civil rights, or consumer products. The reasons
38. Hannah v. Larche, 363 U.S. 420, 443-44 (1960); cf. FFC v. Schrieber,
381 U.S. 279 (1965). In Schrieber, the circuit court ruled that a particular
interrogation ought to be conducted in non-public sessions. The Supreme Court
reversed, holding that the FCC was empowered to conduct its proceedings in
a way best conducive to the proper dispatch of business and the ends of justice.
There are other reasons of course for denying additional due process safeguards. One reason given is that frequent court meddling to enforce due process claims will undermine a system which must rely to some degree on the
exhaustion of administrative remedies. See Myers v. Bethlehem Shipbuilding
Corp., 303 U.S. 41, 50 (1938). Another reason given is a belief by many
courts that public control over policy-making requires an informed public
developed in part, undoubtedly, from free-swinging investigative proceedings.
See ROURKa at 231, 246. The use of publicity as an instrument of public control by government agencies has already been discussed. Id. at 227; n.7 supra.
Yet another reason is that sensationalistic publicity often serves the utilitarian purpose of advancing the popularity of one political interest or personality over another and is very much an accepted part of factional warfare,
particularly between the separate departments of the federal government. Id.
at 228-30. Publicity also plays a useful role in the area of social and economic
regulation generally in an informative manner, without the need for attentiongetting proceedings. Id. at 231.
39. Hannah v. Larche, 363 U.S. 420, 487 (concurring opinion). The clash
between the need for information by administrative agencies and the right to
privacy is long standing, and has seen a general erosion of the latter. See
DAVIs at 159.
40. The waiver of an individual's rights to privacy or protection from defamation must occur when clearly confronted with the informing function of
certain hearings. In these, the primary function is to reach an external audience. But merely because an agency feels there is a need for public airing of
a subject, one commentator has noted, this determination should not be conclusive of the rights to be recognized, especially if potential participants make
an adequate showing of probable "irreparable injury" from any disclosures. A
court might well be suspicious of such a claim if the inquiry's scope is limited
to economic matters or those matters not widely disapproved by the public.
See Note, 72 YAI UJ. 1227, 1237 (1963).
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for publicity are less compelling in the narrow context of proceedings on workmen's compensation, welfare assistance, public
housing evictions, and school discipline. In either type of
proceeding above, the risk of notoriety caused by simultaneous
news coverage, professional journals, or institutional newsletters
is no less real. 41 The points to be made here are that publicity
would never seem to be an essential feature of most investigative
proceedings (except those investigations where the public needto-know and an informative purpose are paramount) and is
seldom a critical aspect of even the broadest of inquiries. Just
as publicity's functional importance may vary with the particular type of investigation, so it would seem also that the ultimate
effects of publicity often bear little or no relation to the investigative events deemed significantly investigative.
The degree of publicity accompanying an investigation relies
on the operation of two variables: the conduct of the investigative proceedings themselves and the activities of the news
disseminating media. Thus, part of the publicity problem is to
study, as the courts did in Hannah and Jenkins, a particular
commission's stated purpose. Is one of its announced objectives
the exposure of certain conduct to the public at large? Are the
objectives some form of indictment, administrative censure, or
other adjudicative action? 41 A second consideration, which is
also favored as a likely indicator of public disfavor, is the
status of participants.2 Is, for example, a particular party a
witness in chief, corroborative witness, informant, defendant,
or perhaps even a non-witness? The type of participation and
its duration are certainly relevant matters here. Some occupations although relatively obscure carry with them a residual
notoriety, such as that associated with being an informant,
federal investigator, labor trouble-shooter, or professional expert.
The fundamental error in relying on only these two factors is
that alone they may have little direct bearing on the absence or
41. A development of the principles herein discussed as they might affect
opprobrium generated in such narrow proceedings is outside of the scope of
this paper.
42. Publicity's strength and weakness as an enforcement device in the regulatory process is the variations in influence which it may have, depending on
the intensity of public disapproval of particular actions or the nature of the
parties concerned. Sensitivity to public opprobrium is governed by the importance of public esteem to the party threatened. See Rounan at 238-40. As
indicated above, "status" may also mean the party's relationship to the proceedings. Since secrecy of police informants is now considered elemental, it is
difficult to see why a similar protection is not afforded to such sources in

this area. See Newman, Federal Agency Investigations: Procedural Rights of
The Subpoenaed Witness, 60 MIcH. L. REv. 169, 179, (1961-62).
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presence of public opprobrium. Perhaps more indicative is a
study of what might be described as the after-processes which
often occur during or immediately following certain types of
investigations. 8 How much broader are these types of results
than those stemming from an announced purpose? To determine
this, the focus must be on the disconnected processes such as
re-assignment, promotion or demotion, delay in promotion, blacklisting, censure, suspension, threats of indictment or involvement
in subsequent proceedings, police harassment, and bugging, which
may flow out of casual contacts with an investigative commission having an otherwise innocuous purpose. The question
remains-is the study of after-processes best developed from
a particular investigation in progress or is it found in similar
previous investigations? The answer is, of course, both. Since
the objective is to anticipate unfavorable opinion, what meager
"case law" experience there is on the effects of previous administrative investigations would be helpful. 44 By the same token,
there would seem to be nothing to preclude an agency from
monitoring its investigations during pendency to detect any
after-processes which might signal nascent public contempt.
Another factor is the &ubjectmatter 4 5 of particular investigative proceedings. Some subjects, like use of drugs, unionism, or
crime, are peculiarly sensitive and have the potential for notoriety no matter when or where investigated. Other subjects may
exhibit a high notoriety potential because of the peculiar location
of the investigation.
A third category of subjects, innocuous in themselves, take on
a charged character because of the timing of events occurring
collaterally and independently of the investigation itself. Examples are a riot, a crime wave, or an industrial disaster, whose
publicity soon overruns that originally associated with the investigation. These events need not have caused the commission's
creation, yet a minor role in any one of the above-described
43. Recognition of similar insidious effects of unfavorable publicity following an investigation is found in Galloway, Congressional Investigations: Proposed Reforms, 18 U. CmI. L. REv. 478, 480 (1950-51) (hereinafter cited as
GALLOWAY).

44. The problem here is the diversity of non-judicial precedent, suggesting
a need for better and more scientific methods of documenting such information. See Newman, 49 CAIF. L. REv. 215, 221 (1961).
45. Rourke has noted that the effectiveness of a publicity sanction as an
instrument of governmental regulatory control depends to a large extent on
the intensity of public disapproval of the activity. For instance, exposure of
offenses against economic regulations may appear relatively bland, but in the
case of an offender in a monopoly situation or highly competitive industry,
such disclosures could be traumatic. 24 U. Cur. L. REv. at 231.
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investigations may incur a degree of opprobrium wholly unrelated in intensity to the degree of the participation.
A study of the investigative methods of a particular commission is also worthwhile. What kind of treatment is accorded its
witnesses? Are the sessions entirely public, without recourse
to closed hearings during testimony of an inflammatory nature?
Or, conversely, are investigations conducted entirely behind
closed doors? Between these extremes there are of course
gradations of mixing. Closed session advantages may also be
compromised if the commission has the power to release the
46
record publicly, either partially, entirely, or in edited form.
Aside from a commission's own authority over its methods at
the outset, what actually occurs during a particular investigation
may indicate an immediate need for more due process protections. For example, public questioning of a witness may be
inadvertently caustic or ridiculing. Its duration may be out of
proportion to the relevance of the testimony's contents. The
institution of contempt proceedings may also tend to unduly
discredit a witness. The testimony of subsequent witnesses may
implicate a participant beyond what was expected at the time
he first took part.
The activities of the news disseminating media, particularly
during public sessions, is another important consideration.47
Live television or radio commentary is one exacerbating possibility. Less spontaneous are techniques relying on the filming,
photographing or sketching for later use by television and
periodicals; sessions routinely attended and commented on by
correspondents; sessions attended by varying numbers of the
curious public. Most of these dissemination alternatives, without
more, are merely a mechanical means for distributing information and can usually be presumed to be objective. Somewhat
different by nature are disclosures made to the media by members
46. An example of a prosecutorial proceeding which through absolute
secrecy of its record is able to render inert its potency for severe harm
through adverse publicity is, of course, the grand jury. As a result, the
absence of almost all but a bare minimum of due process safeguards has not
for the most part generated any pre-trial, unofficial sanctions. See Note, 72
YALE L.J. 1227, 1231-32 (1963). The Jenkins majority considered the grand
jury an example of an accusative body which "merely investigates and reports.
It does not try." 395 U.S. at 430.

47. "'Here,' said the managing editor, as he circled the item with his pencil,

'is a lie.' 'I know it is a lie, but I must print it because it is spoken by a
prominent public official. The public official's name and position make the lie
news.'" The quote is by 0. K. Bovard of the St. Louis Post-Dispatch, from
Dilliard, CongressionalInvestigations: The Role of the Press, 18 U. CHI. L.

Rsv. 585, 587 (1950-51).
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of an investigative commission or other participants in the form
of post-hearing news conferences, impromptu interviews, public
speeches, news releases, or "leaks" of an unspecified origin, as
well as reports to subordinate and higher agencies. This type
of dissemination is unlikely to be a careful re-publication of
the record and will in many instances incorporate facts out of
context which have a poorly veiled purpose of persuading listeners and readers. On such occasions, it is likely that an
audience will be unable to evaluate the underlying basis of the
utterance or document.
A final factor, and one which is less certain in relationship,
necessarily, to either the cause or effect in the formation of
defamatory matter, is the occurrence of opprobrium-indicative
events. Inflammatory journalism, acts of social ostracism, loss
of a job, and publicized threats or attempts on a participant's
life are examples. Such matters would seem to have an accelerative influence on public disfavor. They are also reliable indicators of developing rancor, and as such, are worth acknowledging.
Admittedly, the above considerations are at best a somewhat
inexact method for detecting an atmosphere of potential notoriety. The detection of such an atmosphere well in advance of
harm is the obligation derived from Jenkins, however. Because
some of the factors are peculiarly subjective does not mean the
area is so speculative as to be unmanageable. The obligation
requires that two types of determinations be made. The first,
it seems clear, is a preliminary one involving such matters as
an inquiry's purpose, the status of its target participants, its
subject matter, likely investigative methods, and the potential
incidence of news dissemination. The other determination,
faurther along in the inquiry, involves a reevaluation of the
foregoing factors as well as consideration of any after-processes
and opprobrium-indicative events that have surfaced. To some
extent all of these facets are really only part of a "purpose"
test. Their thrust, however, is a broadening of that test so that
it focuses on more realistic indicators.
Just as the harmless purpose of a proceeding at the outset
may not mean that its effects are harmless, so the presence of
widespread public knowledge probably does not spell the inevitability of public distaste. The major hurdle in this area is to
isolate any factors which will prove reliable. Whatever method
of analysis is adopted, it does not appear that it will be a great
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deal more free wheeling than that already in use to differentiate
between adjudicative and investigative bodies.
Another question is whether these factors are apparent only
from the vantage point of hindsight, so that a reviewing court
is actually the first body capable of accurately assessing the
brunt of opprobrium arising from a proceeding. While this
may be true to some degree, an ad hoc determination of similar
matters by an administrative agency would not seem useless
merely because the evaluation rests on fewer or less certain
considerations. Being closer in time to the proceedings is not
necessarily a disadvantage when attempting to size up the
notoriety potential of the subject matter, collateral events, and
unofficial after-processes.
IV. DuXE PRoCEss ALTERaNATrVES rOR CoN-oN-nO

PUBLIC OPPROBRIUM

The subject of additional procedural due process rights in
investigative proceedings has been thoroughly treated by other
journals, so that a detailed summary of these proposals is
beyond the scope of this paper. 43 The prospects of Court recog-

nition of the less than clear element of public opprobrium,
however, suggest a need for recognizing a few of the procedural
problems and their alternative answers.
It is not true that any further recognition of individual procedural rights during an investigation must be at the expense of
investigative efficiency. 49 A threat of public rancor suggests
two alternative responsibilities of due process in this area 5 control of information reaching the public and opportunity for
rebuttal. It merits little more than a passing observation that
procedural efficiency remains virtually unaffected by permitting a right to executive sessions, 51 the silent but advisory pres48. See DAVIS; JAFFE; ROURKE; GALLOWAY; NEWMAN; and Note, 72 YALE
L. J.1227 (1963).
49. The basic inquiry of any court when faced with a request for more due
process protections must be how the procedural efficiency will be affected if
the request is granted, or rather, will the public interest be served in any
manner by following a rights-denying policy. That interest in most cases must
be to ensure that "correct determinations" are made, within some tolerable
margin of error to avoid cost or delay. The problem, as Newman sees it, is
locating the margin of tolerable error. 49 CALIF. L. REV. at 227-28.
SO. See Newman, Due Process,Investigations,and Civil Rights, 8 U.C.L.A.L.

REv. 735 (1961) ; Note, 72 YALE L. J. 1227, 1241 (1963).
51. The concern that secret hearings are inherently inquisitional is largely
mitigated by the presence of counsel, at least in an advisory capacity. See
Note, 72 YALE L. J. 1227, 1236-37n.44 (1963).
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ence of counsel,5 2 a monetary fine for improper disclosures of
the record outside of the proceedings, and allowing some type of
suit for defamation by the ill-timed utterances of investigative
or quasi-investigative officials. 5 3 These are protections which

for the most part are unconnected with the efficient course of
proceedings toward their objective. Yet these rights are important to the limited flow of information into public channels of
consumption.
Rebuttal by a defamed witness (or, for that matter, by a
non-witness), 54 on the other hand, will undoubtedly involve
damage to the efficiency of any investigative process. The right
conjures up at the very minimum the opportunity for confrontation and cross examination.5 5 It may involve the privilege
of introducing into the record some evidence, sworn statements,
or witnesses on one's own behalf. 56 There may be a need also to
provide a participant with a copy of the transcript,s7 as well as
52. This right is absolute where an administrative body must adhere to

§ 6 (a) of the Administrative Procedure Act. 60 Stat. 240 (1946), 5 U.S.C.
§ 1005(a) (1958). Newman, Federal Agency Investigations: Procedural
Rights of The Subpoenaed Witness, 60 MIcH. L. Rsv. 169, 170-71 (1961-62).
As a result, the FTC now recognizes the right during non-public hearings for
counsel to enter objections of record. See Note, 72 YALE L. J. 1227 (1963).
53. Disclosure of information to the public by agency employees is a statutory violation in some cases. Other statutes permit disclosures at an agency's
discretion, as in the case of the FTC, CAB, and SEC. But the Supreme Court
has held that such an agency determination is judicially reviewable. DAvis
at 225.
54. The plaintiff in Jenkins was a non-witness with audacity enough to
claim injury. He was a member of a labor union which in some way had been
adversely reflected upon. The discrimination against non-parties is evident
from the fact they are not entitled to a notice of the proceedings even though
they provide documents for the investigation. See Note, Resisting Enforcement of Administrative Subpoenas Duces Tecum: Another Look At CAB v.
Hermann, 69 YALE L. J. 131, 140n.71 (1959).
55. See JAFFE at 757, 850. A need in this area is a precise definition of what
"confrontation!' and "cross examination" should consist of in the administrative
context. Newman, 49 CALiF. L. R~v. 215, 221 (1961). Newman has suggested
that no greater rights are needed than already recognized in normal adversary
proceedings. He notes that one problem peculiar to the investigative area is
that in some instances there will be no one to confront or cross examine, such
as when an anonymous tipster provides a lead, or when a witness is being
queried about reports which he has submitted. Federal Agency Investigations:
Procedural Rights of the Subpoenaed Witness, 60 Micir. L. REv. 169, 177
(1961-62). He suggests that if allowing cross examination is too costly in
time, confrontation alone might be appropriate. Id. at 180.
56. GALLOWAY at 491; Newman, Federal Agency Investigations: Procedural
Rights of the Subpoenaed Witness, 60 MicH. L. Rzv. 169, 179-80 (1961-62);
JAFFE at 854.

57. The Administrative Procedure Act § 6 (b) requires that such be provided to every person required to submit information or evidence, except if it
is a non-public hearing, in which case inspection of the official transcript is
adequate. 60 Stat. 24 (1946); 5 U.S.C. § 1005(a) (1958).
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provide him opportunity to make motions, arguments, and assert privileges."8 It is in this area of rebuttal, then, that a
balancing of the private and the public interests needs to occur.
Moreover, the unqualified right to rebuttal seems more appropriate in an open proceeding where the risks of defamation are
very great than in a proceeding exclusively in executive session.
Recognition of this right with its tendency to convert a proceeding into a slow-moving adversary proceeding is far more likely
to draw the fire of critics. A strong point against the recognition
of an opportunity for rebuttal here is that, even permitting it to
its fullest extent, rebuttal may have little effect on curbing the
spread of rampant public opprobrium. Damaging disclosures
can easily pre-empt banner headlines or succinct television news
commentary, while a later rebuttal or retraction on the record
may pass through the media without comment.5 9 More importantly, rebuttal is poor protection against disfavor arising from
certain inflammatory subjects.60 A repugnant status such as an
infiltrated informant, or the techniques of the more sensationalistic of news media, particularly the "hate literature" distributed by private extremist organizations, may also lessen the
value of rebuttal.
Far less likely to be lost in the wash of public disfavor is the
other alternative-control of information and in most instances,
its denial to the public. Heavy reliance on executive sessions61
and the other rights mentioned above are only four of several
alternatives under this heading. Also useful are such things as 2
1) prohibiting the filing of any report by a commission
without the concurrence of the majority of its members;
58. See JArv at 754. The danger is that disclosures may be compelled during the hearing to determine the extent of the immunity privilege claimed.
See Edwards v. United States 312 U.S. 473 (1941).
59. The responsibility of ensuring that this does not occur is that of the

follow-up writers of editorials. See Dilliard, Congressional Investigations:

The Role of The Press, 18 U. CrI. L. REv. 585, 588 (1950-51).
60. Particular public antipathy of the involvement with subversive activities
and loyalty-security matters has been the spark behind action by many courts
in this area. See RouRxE at 246.

61. SEC custom is to hold private proceedings unless, in exceptional cases,

the investigation has a quasi-legislative purpose. See JArr at 758. One judge

has recommended that secret proceedings not be forced on a party without the
concurrence of a majority of a commission. GALLOWAY at 494.

62. The basic source of these recommendations, except as modified slightly,

is GALLOWAY at 496-98. According to him, these safeguards are from a listing
of 41 of the most common suggestions appearing in some 14 recently proposed
codes for the improvement of due process safeguards. Only those particularly

applicable to the discussion of unfavorable publicity have been included here.
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2) prohibiting publication of any unfavorable statement
unless the person reflected on has been advised of its
content and given the opportunity of filing a sworn
statement in reply;
3) prohibiting the speaking, writing, or lecturing on the
topic of the investigation by any commission member;
4) permitting the taking of secret testimony only in the
presence of more than one other member of the commission, besides the interrogator;
5) prohibiting public statements by commission members,
as well as the photographing or making of moving pictures, televising or recording broadcasts of any proceedings;
6) prohibiting the release to the public of any information
taken in executive sessions without the concurrence of a
majority of the commission;
7) creation by statute of a civil penalty for false testimony;
8) prohibiting the distribution of a transcript which has
been edited or altered for publication;
9) prohibiting any commission member from making any
summary or prediction of the outcome before issuance of
an official report;
10) release of all testimony on which a report is based concurrently with the report.

3

The desirable solution should require that a large measure of
discretion be left to an administrative agency, in view of the
many types of investigative bodies that exist or can be created.
Along this same line, it has been suggested that the most resourceful of protectors of due process would be an enlightened body of
investigative personnel in the administrative fields,6 4 perhaps

even a permanent civil service for the conduct of investigations
at various levels of government. But such a body would have to
be willing to adopt self-imposed restraints.6 5 An alternative
63. In Jenkins, the majority enumerated a few of its objections to the due
process model followed by the Louisiana commission. 395 U.S. at 429-30.
Among them are the stringent limitations on the right of a party to confronta-

tion and cross examination of hostile witnesses, since it was limited to those
summoned as witnesses themselves. Cross examination was limited to those
questions approved in advance by the Commission. The opinion also found

fault with the limits on a party's right to introduce evidence or witnesses on
his own behalf.
64. GALLOWAY at 483.

65. RouRa

at 243.
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would be the imposition by statute of a core of minimum due
process standards governing fair hearing procedures. 6 Whatever the solution, as a long term guide it would seem likely that
"[t]he elements of a workable code are to be found in the best
practices of successful investigating committees."67
RoBmr 0. CoNorxy

66. GALLOWAY
67. Id. at 495.

at

492.
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